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AESTHETICS AND JUDGMENT
– “WHY KANT GOT IT RIGHT”
Morten Kyndrup
ABSTRACT
The article argues that although all scholars within aesthetics ba-
sically know and recognize it, there is a tendency in many of its 
traditions to forget or to underestimate the importance of the aes-
thetic judgment. With Thierry de Duve’s short paper “Why Kant got 
it Right” as its point of departure, this importance is discussed. Not 
only its importance in aesthetic relations and to aesthetics as a dis-
cipline, but also in a broader sense, through the contribution to the 
overall social cohesion of society, offered by aesthetic judgments. 
All judgments are pronounced as-if a shared scale of aesthetic 
preferences did exist (which it does not). Judgments are addressed 
to communities, to the notion of a joint “we”, and thus they do par-
ticipate in the creation and the maintenance of the social as such. 
Also professional aesthetic critique, including art critique, should 
be aware of that, since even historically achieved differentiations 
and divisions of labour may be lost again if not being developed and 
kept up to date.
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This brief paper is about what we all know, all scholars within the 
field of aesthetics – but what we, nevertheless, still seem to have a 
tendency to forget, or at least seem to distort or to misrepresent on 
different levels. At issue is which kind of quality or value we are ac-
tually dealing with, when we talk about aesthetic qualities or aes-
thetic values. What are their modes of existence, their conceptual 
place, their ontological status? And, of course, how come we often 
neglect basic questions like these?
The reasons for this are buried, as we also know, in the histo-
ry of the discipline of aesthetics. That history is closely connected, 
and intertwined with, entangled with other disciplinary histories, 
above all with that of art in a modern sense.
The Nordic Journal of Aesthetics, No. 54 (2017), pp. 75–85
76
I.
I will make use of a small article by Thierry de Duve, as my point of 
departure. It is called, “Why Kant Got It Right”.1 Thierry de Duve’s 
groundbreaking work, in the intersection between the disciplines 
of art history and aesthetics, will be known to most scholars with-
in both fields. De Duve, Belgian by origin, has worked primarily 
in Canada, France, and the US, and he now lives and works in New 
York. His books include Nominalisme Pictural and Au nom de l’art 
from the 1980s, and for instance Du nom au nous from 1990. Most 
of his work until then was revised and published in English, in the 
MIT Press Volume Kant after Duchamp from 1998.2 “After” is to be 
understood here in the double sense of the word, i.e. both “après” 
and “d’après” in French. You may also know Thierry de Duve’s 
work from his recent suite of essays about the development of the 
modern concept of art published in Artforum, from 2013-14.3 De 
Duve’s readings/re-readings of Immanuel Kant’s crucial and contin-
ued importance to aesthetics are, in my opinion, among the clear-
est and most pertinent ever given.
In “Why Kant Got It Right”, de Duve takes the good old example 
of Ms. A and Mr. B quarrelling over the beauty of a rose as his point 
of departure, when trying to explain Kant’s account of how we act, 
when experiencing the world aesthetically. As we know, Kant’s dis-
cussion is about whether “beauty” should be seen as a personal and 
subjective feeling or as an objective property of, in this case, the 
rose. Now Kant reflects – in de Duve’s words – “on the fact that peo-
ple in general tend to speak of beauty and ugliness as if these were 
objective properties of the things deemed beautiful or ugly, where-
as they ought to know, […] that their only access to these proper-
ties is their subjective feeling.” To Kant, Ms. A and Mr. B are both 
right in claiming so-called objective validity of their judgements. 
Again, in de Duve’s words – “the phrase ‘this rose is beautiful’ (or 
ugly) actually does not ascribe objective beauty (or ugliness) to the 
rose; rather it imputes to the other – all others – the same feeling of 
pleasure (or pain) that one feels in oneself. Whether Ms. A is right 
in claiming that the rose is beautiful, or Mr. B in claiming that it is 
ugly, their disagreement amounts to rightly shouting at each other, 
even if they do it politely: You ought to feel the way I feel. You ought 
to agree with me.” And de Duve continues, “to say that people right-
ly claim universal approval for their aesthetic judgments, when all 
it takes is one exception to prove them wrong, is to say that this call 
on all others’ capacity for agreeing by dint of feeling is legitimate.” 
And this is, de Duve concludes, “what Kant understood better than 
anyone before, or anyone since.” 
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In de Duve’s reading, Kant’s observations lead to three impor-
tant points. The first one is that aesthetic judgments imply uni-
versal address. The second one is that a true or pure aesthetic 
judgment is a call for agreement by dint of feeling, involuntar-
ily addressed to all. And the third one is that what is ultimate-
ly at stake in an aesthetic judgment is neither the beauty of the 
rose, nor the feeling it arouses; it is the agreement. Still accord-
ing to de Duve. And he concludes – now in Immanuel Kant’s own 
words, “… beauty is not a concept of the object, and the judgment 
of taste is not a judgment of cognition. It asserts only that we are 
justified in presupposing, universally in every human being, the 
same subjective conditions of the power of judgment that we find 
in ourselves”.4 All we do, de Duve included, is to make the presup-
position that the way we feel is shareable by all, meaning that the 
implied ‘you ought to feel the way I feel’ “is what justifies me in 
my claim, you in yours, and all our fellow human beings in theirs, 
even though there is not a hope in the world for universal agree-
ment among us.”
II.
All this should of course be well known to all of us, but as we also 
know, varying traditions within the disciplines of aesthetics have 
approached these theories in very different ways and with changing 
emphases, and some even openly ignoring those basic properties 
of the engendering of aesthetic value in general. On my account, I 
would like to add and to emphasize in connection with de Duve’s 
precise observations, above all, the fact that an aesthetic judgment 
is always singular. Any aesthetic judgment process establishes a 
very specific kind of connection between three topoi or positions. 
These are (1) the “I” pronouncing the judgment, the object, (2) the 
“it”, which the judgment is about, and (3) the “we”, to which the judg-
ment is addressed. By that, the aesthetic judgment in a peculiar way 
connects us with the social as such, with the togetherness, or more 
precisely, with the idea of such a joint community, by addressing it 
as-if the outcome of the judgment were an objective, shared prop-
erty of the object. Important here, is that the pronunciation of an 
aesthetic judgment thus actually creates a passage, un passage 
from the “I” over the “it” to the “we” (or to the idea of a “we”), thus 
actually connecting us with each other. But at the same time, this 
process of course, does in fact create or produce this “we”, which it 
addresses. Just like it, in its own way, produces (and is produced by) 
the “I”, the individual position from which “I” can pronounce this 
judgment. Aesthetic judgments and aesthetic value thus, I would 
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claim, contribute decisively to the production and maintenance of 
the functioning social community of modernity.5
Of course, neither the “I” nor the “we” are defined anew and 
out of nowhere, in each and every singular act of aesthetic judg-
ment. Firstly, we are always already members of communities of 
taste, more or less institutionalized, in the societies, in which we 
live. Secondly, these communities of taste have a history, which 
means that any aesthetic judgment is made on the backdrop of aes-
thetic traditions, existing judgments, and all kinds of institutional-
ized attitudes. Thirdly, the objects, at least when they are artefacts, 
themselves embed, what might be called prescribed or implied aes-
thetic judgments, drawing on and referring to communities and his-
tories of taste. So, what you do meet is actually never just a blank 
object, but rather an ultra-complex embedded proposal for an aes-
thetic judgment. In addition, artefacts always include themselves as 
communicative entities, “enoncés”; embodying their own positions 
of enunciation, even in terms of implied levels of positions, usual-
ly referred to as “enunciated enunciation”.6
However, despite these facts of enunciational and social em-
beddedness or framing: At the bottom line, the aesthetic judgment 
is still singular, and it produces a position-defining passage be-
tween ourselves, the object world, and the notion of a community.
III.
But back to Thierry de Duve. As some of you may know, he makes 
the claim, in what he calls the ‘Kant after Duchamp approach’, that 
the change of the concept and of the whole field of art in mature 
modernity produces a new position of and situation for the judg-
ment of taste. Today, says de Duve, “this is beautiful” is replaced 
by “this is art”. To de Duve, the judgment of taste is transferred to 
an institutional level of ascribing or not ascribing possible works 
of art to the legitimate field of art – thus replacing “the social func-
tion of beauty” in early modernity with “the social function of art”. 
The judgment of taste, it should be added, remains singular and has 
the same general form. 
The idea of such a replacement and displacement of the judg-
ment of taste is interesting. To a certain extent, it is even adequate, 
but it is also disputable on several levels. It is true, no doubt, that in 
many contexts the “this is art”-question has both the shape and the 
functions of the original aesthetic judgment. But I am not convinced 
that these functions have been taken completely over by this rather 
institutional level. Aesthetic judgments are still being pronounced 
vis-à-vis singular artefacts, be it works of art or other perceived 
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objects in our shaped world, or even in nature. But besides that, 
the assertion of such a transference of the aesthetic judgment to 
the field of art exclusively, raises other clusters of problems. One 
of these concerns the history of the discipline of aesthetics with its 
notoriously delicate relationship with the field of art. Others per-
tain to the question about the existence of aesthetic judgments, also 
in connection with other artefacts than works of art.
IV.
On this occasion, I am not going to dive deeply into this discipli-
nary history and its problems. As we know, ‘“art” and “the aes-
thetic” in the sense in which we understand the substance and the 
functions of these concepts today – be it with stringency or obscu-
rity – have both come into existence as parts of the Modern. The 
fact that art and the aesthetic have come into existence at the same 
time, as parts of the same process, and even such that their forma-
tion histories are, to a great extent, mutually motivated and highly 
interdependent does, however, not imply that these concepts actu-
ally deal with or signify the same, neither substantially nor func-
tionally. There has been, and there still is a historical tendency that 
Modernity does not want to take its own differentiations, its own 
production of differences all that seriously. Maybe as a defence 
against the limitlessness of immanence, against the frightening 
fact that differences, so obviously brought on by history, are actual-
ly differences that may have become mutually exclusive, emergent, 
impossible to restore to the unity of earlier stages. In the same way, 
even differentiations, such as “art” and “the aesthetic”, taking place 
in the very same process and being conditioned by the very same 
historical changes, may end up belonging to completely different 
registers, both conceptually and phenomenally. 
As we know, the tendency to particularly reject, above all, hy-
per-complex asymmetrical formations of differences for the ben-
efit of binary linkages, preferably with hierarchical order and 
classical inside/outside logics, also came to prevail in this case. 
Namely, in the sense that even before the complex and productive 
perspectives in the acknowledgement of the fundamentally diver-
gent constitutions of art and the aesthetic, respectively, really came 
into historical and conceptual existence, their diversities were in 
some sense cancelled by Romanticism and its thinking. In this tra-
dition, the aesthetic act became defined as “an act of reason”, art as 
“the teacher of mankind”.7 And aesthetics as a discipline was turned 
into being defined, as it is the case in G.W.F. Hegel’s aesthetic lec-
tures, as “philosophy of art” tout court.8 In this tradition, aesthetics 
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becomes the discourse, which knows (or claims to know) what art 
is. In Hegel’s approach, art’s primary mode of existence is, as you 
know, narrowly connected to what might be called the truth con-
tent of art. And the truth content is that by which art, in its specific 
way, contributes to our cognition of the world, even in a normative 
sense. On the other hand, since the aesthetic is also still supposed 
to deal with a distinctively sensuous cognition, art becomes, liter-
ally spoken, squeezed into an aesthetic double packing, into what 
has been called “the aesthetic regime of art” by Jacques Rancière.9 
The metaphor of “regime” is adequate, because it comprises the el-
ement of restraint or of discursive control of the potentials of art 
implied by this understanding of aesthetics. However, these restric-
tions actually work both ways. Art is kept caught within the under-
standing of its translatability into its cognitive content. Admittedly, 
an extremely privileged cognitive content, but still one that can be 
conceived and dealt with within the framework of ordinary discur-
sive forms of exchange. Conversely, at the same time, the aesthet-
ic is confined by its function as the generalised translator of art, 
the tough master of art and its humble servant, all at once. All in 
all, a function so completely different from the far more original-
ly uncontrollable aesthetic one, both conceptually and phenome-
nally, in the living exchange of judgments of taste directed against 
the singularities.
In that way, “Aesthetic value” became a matter for the “good 
taste” – became something, which apparently concerns stable and 
thus controllable, cognitive qualities in the world of objects. 
Based on the history of the coming into being of art and the aes-
thetic, there is nothing mysterious in this alliance or “marriage”, 
as I have called this relationship between art and the aesthetic.10 
The fact that this partnership, historically as well as functionally, 
comes to prove itself so surprisingly stable, is obviously due to its 
ability to fulfil certain manifest needs, especially for the formula-
tion and the maintenance of the conceptual area of art. The price 
to pay for this, however, is firstly this peculiar and, in the long run, 
utterly inappropriate cognitive bias of the purpose of art – criti-
cized explicitly by Jean-Marie Schaeffer, among others, for actu-
ally having ruined or distorted art’s development this way by what 
he calls, “speculative tradition”.11 But this bias has also eventually 
been criticized more implicitly by art itself through all kinds of re-
newed emphases of artworks on sensuous aesthetic qualities, liter-
ally untransferable to cognitive truth content.
Secondly, of course, the price of this marriage has included the 
chronic amnesia or obscuration of certain sets of possibilities to 
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understand and to act according to the initial difference between 
the two partners. This amnesia includes the obscuration of an ad-
equate understanding of aesthetic experience outside art, and to 
some extent, even an oblivion of the fundamental mechanisms and 
qualities of the act of pronouncing an aesthetic judgment, an obliv-
ion which is even somewhat surprisingly often performed in the 
name of a discipline calling itself “aesthetics”. In a wider sense, 
this amnesia and its systematic downplay of the function and po-
sition of the singular aesthetic judgment is connected, above all, 
with an even peculiarly consistent, insufficient theoretical and his-
torical understanding of the so-called autonomy of art. This state 
of things has also had a hampering effect or an adverse influence 
on many levels of the artistic practice, not least furthered by blink-
ered art criticism, in this sense too. An historical and theoretical 
exposure of lacunas and aporias in the various understandings of 
the autonomy of art, however, would require a thorough analysis 
and a discussion of its own, which would take us too far here. But 
just preliminarily, it can, at any rate, be stated that the “aesthet-
ic regime”, in the shape of the “marriage”, has caused the autono-
my of art to have been ascribed too little and too much importance, 
all at one and the same time. Too little importance, inter alia, be-
cause of the permanent “dictum of reinscription” of the quest for 
truth. A dictum, which despite riot after riot on the part of art, is 
still, to a large extent, fencing art, controlling it, not least due to cu-
rators and to an art criticism obeying this paradigm – all in all mak-
ing “the institution” far more restrictive than it supposedly needed 
to be, when asking each work of art, which truth it represents or is 
about. Conversely, at the same time, the autonomy has been giv-
en too much importance because of the role and the monopoly of 
aesthetics as a totalizing gatekeeper, one that has obstructed any 
more direct understanding of the matters of artworks, i.e. political 
or cognitive matters, at distinct levels, respectively.
V.
Beyond any doubt, however, “aesthetics” in this speculative or cog-
nitive tradition of “marriage” has engendered important thinking 
without which we would have missed substantial insights about 
our civilization. In this tradition, not just philosophical thinking 
about art, but also general philosophy on the occasion of art has 
unfolded. Th.W. Adorno’s work is a brilliant example. Aesthetics 
as philosophy of art has taught us a great deal about the role of 
art, not least about its outstanding cognitive capabilities. However, 
this tradition has taught us less about the specific properties and 
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mechanisms of aesthetic relationality in a broader sense, includ-
ing how they actually function in connection with artworks and our 
aesthetic appreciations of these. In particular, the theoretical un-
derstanding and the analysis of the actual meeting with the artwork, 
in an aesthetical relation, is surprisingly weak within many of the 
traditions of art understanding. The interrelationship between pre-
scribed/embedded and concretized aesthetic relationality, includ-
ing the anatomy and the function of the pronounced judgments, has 
in terms of thematics, fallen into a gradually accepted deep abyss 
between aesthetics as a philosophical discipline on the one hand, 
and the individual disciplines of the art sciences, on the other hand 
(e.g. art history, literary science, etc.).
Aesthetics in terms of sheer philosophy of art actually makes 
us strangely short of concepts. We might of course then just in-
vent some new concepts to cover these obvious lacunas adequately. 
However, that would not really solve the problem of the interrela-
tionship between art and the aesthetic. The field of art, its artworks, 
are capable of so much more than just of being aesthetic objects. 
They may play a role per se for actual cognition in many contexts, 
for artisanship, and even for politics. Once again, the widespread 
simplified understanding of the base and function of the autono-
my of art simultaneously narrows down and dilutes the function of 
art. Moreover, where aesthetic judgments are concerned, they are 
to be found not just in connection with artworks. Objects of design 
are obvious examples, but to an increasing degree, on all levels of 
artefacts, our contemporary world is “designed”, it is deliberately 
formed and thus implicitly addressed to us, also aesthetically. This 
“aestheticization” has an overwhelming and accelerating extension. 
Here, we obviously need to distinguish between genuine aesthetic 
relations, with their proper judgments of taste in a strict sense on 
the one hand, and all other possible forms of individual preferenc-
es (of taste) rather oriented towards the fulfilment of needs, on the 
other hand – something, which, as you know, already Kant did.12
Surely, however, art still needs aesthetics, just like aesthetics 
needs art. Art and aesthetic value in their modern senses are mutu-
ally motivated by each other, and this is true, both in terms of their 
processes of coming into existence and of their mutual functions. 
Without the fundamental separation of poiesis and aisthesis, which 
were core parts of the differentiation processes in early Modernity, 
there would be no “autonomous” art to address itself to the poten-
tial judgments of taste of an audience, conceptionally generalised 
and distinctively individualized, at one and the same time. Without 
aesthetic value, no art, one might say. Without audience, without 
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judgment of taste, nothing “particular” about art. And conversely; 
without art, no aesthetics, in the sense that, without “art” no par-
ticular palisade, no “templum” for the cultivation and the develop-
ment of specific ‘aesthetic’ modes of addressing the world, the way 
these have been unfolded throughout the history of Modernity, in 
which art obtains exactly the function of being the initial, highly 
productive and privileged laboratory of the aesthetic. 
VI.
Thankfully, this highly complex interrelationship between art 
and philosophy of art on the one hand, and aesthetic relational-
ity and aesthetics on the other hand, today, has become increas-
ingly acknowledged by the differing traditions of aesthetics. 
Correspondingly, the disciplines of the art sciences have also start-
ed to take an increasing interest in aesthetic relationality. The 
American art historian, James Elkins, has even recently staged a 
systematic discussion of the historical and current relationship be-
tween the varying positions of approach within aesthetics and art 
sciences, respectively. A discussion, which quite convincingly end-
ed up demonstrating, above all, a considerable mutual ignorance in 
both camps.13
Still, although we may know the importance of the aesthetic 
judgment, across the varying traditions within aesthetics, we still 
have a reoccurring tendency to forget; to forget, above all, the sin-
gularity of the aesthetic judgment and thus the hyper-complex in-
terplay between individual and joint layers in the phenomenon of 
taste. Each and every singular judgment of taste still produces a 
passage, connecting “me” with an imagined common sense, a sen-
sus communis through a piece of shared object world. By this, aes-
thetic judgments have a specific and considerable civilizational 
force. I am not asserting that aesthetic judgments created modern 
civilization, certainly not. But they do form part of what makes it 
possible for us to live together in an overall sense. This possibility 
is, I should add, by no means self-evident or, for that matter, an au-
tomatic implication of la condition moderne. On the contrary, this 
ability of pronouncing sharable aesthetic judgments needs to be 
learned, to be developed and to be maintained. Actually, our en-
tire educational system should attend to this far more. We should 
remind ourselves that also historically produced differentiations 
and abilities may be lost, may disappear. 
I am not truly worried on behalf of the aesthetic judgment. 
However, signs which might make us concerned, do exist. One is 
the state of the professional aesthetic critique, the institutionalized 
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version of the individual judgment of taste. This critique performs 
the very same mechanisms and thus it is, not least historically, a 
very important player in the creation and recreation of aesthetic 
relationality. There is however, a tendency today that serious crit-
icism in connection with art, design, etcetera, is losing ground, 
when compared to more marketing-oriented presentations of arte-
facts. Another concern might be the explosive development of the 
activities on all the social media. As we know, these may be seen, 
on the one hand, as a kind of democratization of access, also to 
pronouncing judgments in the public space. This is a positive fact. 
On the other hand, there is a tendency that these millions of opin-
ions, including more or less strictly aesthetic judgments circulat-
ing in cyberspace, emphasize the “I-position” far more than the 
addressed “we”, that the gesture of addressing is losing importance 
for the benefit of promoting the “I-position” as a more self-serving 
entity. That might ruin the delicate balance between the positions 
in the ideal-typical judgment of taste and thus turn the socializing 
passage of aesthetic relationality into a dead end street of individ-
ual idiosyncrasies.
If that happened, it would no doubt have negative consequences 
for the important contribution to civilization and its mechanisms 
of exchange, which are signed by the judgment of taste. However, 
it might also change the basic mechanisms of our ways of dealing 
with art – and these are the very mechanisms, which, at the end of 
the day, guarantee and maintain the space of freedom, in which 
art lives, its “autonomy”. It is a known fact that autonomy does not 
owe its existence to the actual objectual nature of the artworks, but 
rather to the specific way in which we acknowledge and deal with 
them – and deal with each other on occasion of them.
“Kant got it right”, indeed, but “right”, not in the sense that Kant’s 
analysis of the aesthetic judgment provides us with a “righter” or 
closer understanding of the meaning of singular works of art. In 
a polemical opposition against an interpretation like that, Arthur 
Danto (in the mentioned discussion by Elkins about the relation-
ship between aesthetics and art history) stated that, “…Kant is 
something that does not belong in this conversation. Beauty be-
longs in this conversation, but Kant belongs in the library”.14
It is hard not to agree that Kant should certainly be made avail-
able to us at the library, but his work is indeed substantially central 
to any discussion about beauty. This is the fact, because “Kant got 
it right” in the sense that his analysis and description of the prem-
ises and mechanisms of the aesthetic judgment is adequate, is true. 
In that sense, Kant’s analysis belongs to science, belongs to the 
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scientific humanities, which investigate the conditions for produc-
tion and interchange of varying kinds of signification of the world 
in which we live – in order to acknowledge and describe them and to 
understand how and why we act and signify in distinctive contexts. 
This is what it is all about: understanding what goes on in our pro-
duction of signification. Any such understanding may be adequate, 
may be “right” or not. Where the mechanisms of the aesthetic 
 judgment are concerned, Kant certainly got it right.
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